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Insurance
By EARL FREDERICK STRAUB, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, insurance law has received inadequate
treatment in the Kentucky Law Survey, being discussed inde-
pendently only once in the past five years.1 The growing body
of law surrounding Kentucky's uninsured motorist statute2
and the recently developing case law concerning the Kentucky
Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA)A-the "no-fault"
cases-make it necessary to examine insurance law separately.
As the above two areas produced the most significant in-
surance cases during the survey year, this article will be de-
voted entirely to them.4 Only cases decided during the survey
* J.D. 1980, University of Kentucky.
Savage, Kentucky Law Survey-Insurance, 66 Ky. L.J. 631 (1977-1978).
2 Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.20-020 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 KRS §§ 304.39-101 to .39-340 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as MVRA or the
Act].
4 During the survey year, the court of appeals also decided Medical Protective
Co. v. Davis, 581 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), a significant insurance law decision,
although unlike the other cases handed down by the Kentucky appellate courts dur-
ing the year. The question presented the court was "the extent of the liability, if any,
of an insurance company which has offered to defend a malpractice action under a
reservation of rights when the insured refuses to accept the conditional defense and
sustains a default judgment.... ." Id. at 25. The Medical Protective Company was
the malpractice carrier for Dr. Benjamin Jackson. Dr. Jackson was sued for malprac-
tice and on the day of service, the insurer "notified Dr. Jackson that it would take the
necessary steps to protect his interest but only upon a strict reservation of its rights
and defenses under the policy." Id. at 26. Dr. Jackson refused to accept the defense
offered by the insurer under those conditions and decided to conduct his own defense
without assistance of counsel. He failed miserably, the court striking his pleadings
and entering a default judgment against him. As to the insurer's liability, the court of
appeals stated:
That an insured may seek to defend himself without counsel after re-
fusing to accept a defense offered under a reservation of rights is one of the
risks an insurer must take when it elects to offer a defense under a reserva-
tion of rights. If it is correct in its position that the policy does not afford
coverage or has been breached in some way, then it prevails regardless of
whether the insured accepts the defense-but it offers such a defense at its
peril, because if the insured refuses to accept it and elects to defend him-
self, the company is bound by the result, in the absence of fraud or collu-
sion, unless it can establish that the policy did not afford coverage or was
breached by the insured.
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year have been given lengthy discussion, but because it is dif-
ficult to discuss any legal problem apart from its historical
context, placing the cases in their proper chronological per-
spective was given a high priority."
I. UNINSURED MOTORIST CASES
All motor vehicle liability insurance policies issued in
Kentucky must provide coverage for the insured in case of in-
jury caused by an uninsured motorist." This coverage, statuto-
rily required since 1966, has proved to be a fruitful source of
litigation.7 During the survey year the Kentucky Supreme
Court considered two important issues in uninsured motorist
law: (1) the validity of certain contractual exclusions limiting
or precluding coverage and (2) the principle of "stacking."
A. Validity of Contractual Exclusions
1. Owned But Uninsured Vehicles
The Court on two occasions addressed the issue of whether
"a clause in an automobile insurance policy . . . which ex-
cludes from uninsured motorist coverage accidents arising out
of the use of vehicles owned by an insured other than the au-
tomobile described in the liability portion of the policy" is
valid." In both cases the Court held that the clause was valid.
MFA Insurance Cos. v. Whitlock,9 the first of the two cases to
reach the Court, was controlling of the second, Safeco Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Hubbard.10
Id. at 26-27. Since no suggestion of fraud or collusion was made and the company was
unable to provide noncoverage, the insurer was held liable to the limits of its policy.
5 This chronological approach is especially necessary for the uninsured motorists
cases which must be reconciled with more than a decade of precedent.
6 KRS § 304.20-020(1) (Supp. 1978).
7 This survey year alone produced three Kentucky Supreme Court decisions on
the subject. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1979); Safeco Ins. Co.
of America v. Hubbard, 578 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1979); and MFA Ins. Cos. v. Whitlock,
572 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1978).
8 MFA Ins. Cos. v. Whitlock, 572 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1978); Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Hubbard, 578 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1979). Whitlock and Hubbard will be
treated textually accompanying notes 10-33 infra.
9 572 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1978).
10 578 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1979). Both Whitlock and Hubbard reversed court of ap-
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In Whitlock, Richard and Judy Whitlock were injured
when their 1962 Chevrolet was struck by a pickup truck.
When they were unable to collect damages from the uninsured
tortfeasor, the Whitlocks sought recovery from MFA under
the uninsured motorist endorsement of a policy issued on
Richard's 1966 Ford." MFA refused to pay, asserting that the
Whitlocks were occupying Judy's uninsured 1962 Chevrolet at
the time of the accident and that the MFA policy on Rich-
ard's Ford "specifically exclude[d] from coverage accidents
arising out of the use of any vehicle owned by Richard, Judy
or their relatives, other than Richard's 1966 Ford.' 12 If the
exclusion was found to be valid there was no coverage.
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Hubbard"5 presented
the same problem in a slightly different setting. Glenn Hub-
bard, as personal representative for his son, Douglas, who was
killed in his own car in an accident with an uninsured motor-
ist, sued Safeco to recover under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision of both his and Douglas' insurance policies. Safeco
agreed to pay the limit of its policy on Douglas' car but de-
nied liability under the two policies issued to Glenn on other
automobiles. Those policies contained exclusions similar to
the one in the MFA policy issued to Richard Whitlock. 14 Al-
though Douglas' automobile was an insured automobile in the
ordinary sense, the policy defined "insured automobile" as the
automobile described in the policy.1 Again, no coverage ex-
isted if the clause was valid.
In both cases the Court, relying on Commercial Union
peals holdings that the exclusion was invalid. The court of appeals decisions were
Whitlock v. Redman, CA-411-MR (Ky. Ct. App. April 8, 1977) and Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Hubbard, No. 74-1129 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1978). See Savage, supra note
1, at 633.
572 S.W.2d at 856.
12 Id. at 857. The policy provided that the uninsured motorist protection "does
not apply- (a) To bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway vehicle (other
than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured, his spouse, or a relative, or
through being struck by such a highway vehicle. . . ." Id. The policy further defined
"insured automobile" as either "the described automobile" or "a non-owned automo-
bile while being operated by a named insured." Id.
578 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1979).
Id. at 50.
15 Id.
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Insurance Co. v. Delaney16 and State Farm Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Christian7 for the proposition that such exclu-
sions are valid as long as they are reasonable, limited its in-
quiry to the reasonableness of the exclusions. 8 Despite the
contrary position taken in the lower courts and the uncer-
tainty in this area of Kentucky law prior to Whitlock,9 the
Court summarily held the exclusions valid.20 In light of the
conflicting viewpoints of the Kentucky Court of Appeals and
the Kentucky Supreme Court, a thorough analysis of the
Court's determination is necessary.
In 1973, one commentator concluded an in-depth analysis
of the Kentucky position on uninsured motorist law by stat-
ing: "Despite the few decisions handed down by the Kentucky
Court there is a definite trend to favor the insured by follow-
ing the statutory policy of compensating the policyholder for
injuries received through the fault of an uninsured motor-
ist. ' 21 Although Whitlock and Hubbard have cast doubt on
the continuing validity of this conclusion, there was little
question about its accuracy at the time it was written. The
'a 550 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1977). Delaney involved a policy exclusion that elimi-
nated state-owned vehicles from the definition of uninsured automobiles, thereby
precluding coverage under the uninsured motorist endorsement when the uninsured
tortfeasor was driving a state-owned car or truck. The Court held this exclusion was
reasonable and, therefore, not in derogation of the uninsured motorist statute, KRS §
304.20-020. Id. at 500.
17 555 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1977). In Christian, the Court was confronted with an
exclusion for owned, uninsured vehicles, but the vehicle in question was a motorcycle,
which the policy also excluded. Since the Court was more concerned with the motor-
cycle exclusion than the owned, uninsured vehicle exclusion, Christian's precedential
citation should be used carefully.
18 MFA Ins. Cos. v. Whitlock, 572 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Ky. 1978); Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Hubbard, 578 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Ky. 1979).
19 The uncertainty of Kentucky law is evidenced by McNutt v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1973), af'd, 494 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1974).
The federal district court was faced with a fact pattern virtually identical to that
which the Supreme Court of Kentucky later would face in Hubbard, and that federal
court decided Kentucky law would not allow such an exclusion to preclude coverage.
In addition, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Whitlock noted the confusion surround-
ing the area. 572 S.W.2d at 857.
1o MFA Ins. Cos. v. Whitlock, 572 S.W.2d at 857; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 578
S.W.2d at 50. The opinion in Whitlock was written by Justice Clayton; Hubbard was
authored by Justice Reed. No dissent was filed in either case.
21 Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Charting the Kentucky Course, 62 Ky.
L.J. 467, 504 (1973-1974).
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statement was based on a 1970 case, Meridian Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Siddons,22 which has served as the focal point of
numerous Kentucky decisions since 197023 and was a major
factor in the court of appeals' determinations in Whitlock and
Hubbard. It is unfortunate that the Kentucky Supreme Court
chose not to discuss Siddons in either Whitlock or Hubbard
since any understanding of Kentucky uninsured motorist law
is incomplete without reconciling that decision. By examining
the cases from Siddons to the present, however, the Court's
summary disposition of such a debatable issue can be
understood.24
22 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970). Ronald Siddons' stepson, John Schweinhart, was
struck and killed by an uninsured motorist while crossing a street. Judgment was
obtained against the uninsured motorist for $15,000. Lola Siddons, Schweinhart's ad-
ministratrix, sued Meridian Mutual to recover on the uninsured motorist endorse-
ments on two policies issued to Ronald Siddons under which John Schweinhart was
an additional insured. Meridian Mutual contended that its maximum liability was
$10,000, since the policy included a typical other insurance clause which stated:
[I]f the insured has other similar insurance available to him, and applicable
to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of
the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance,
and the Company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to
which this Coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to
the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance.
Id. at 833-34.
The Court held that this clause was void since it purported to reduce recovery below
the statutory minimum of $10,000 required on each policy. Id. at 834.
23 The following is a list of selected cases with holdings based at least in part on
Siddons: McNutt v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1973),
aff'd, 494 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1974) (Kentucky courts would invalidate an exclusion of
the type later found to be valid in Whitlock); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Berger, 311 F.
Supp. 840 (E.D. Ky. 1970) (setoff for medical expenses disallowed); State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 554 (Ky. 1977) (reduction of
uninsured motorist benefits by the amount of workman's compensation benefits paid
disallowed); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Hall, 516 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1974) ("other insurance"
provision in automobile liability insurance policy is void when it purports to reduce
uninsured motorist benefits); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Napier, 505 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1974)
(reaffirmation of the propriety of stacking the coverage of two separate policies).
21 At the time the Court decided Whitlock, this issue was more debatable than
the opinion implies. See note 19 supra for discussion of the uncertainty in the law.
The federal court in McNutt relied on two decisions in making its "educated guess as
to what result the Court of Appeals of Kentucky would reach" were it faced with the
same issue. 369 F. Supp. at 383. Those decisions were Siddons and Allen v. West Am.
Ins. Co., 467 S.W.2d 123 (Ky. 1971) (holding that a household exclusion which effec-
tively denies uninsured motorist coverage is reasonable and therefore not in deroga-
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In Siddons, two provisions in an insurance policy, an
"other insurance" clause and a clause requiring that payments
under the Medical Payments Coverage of the liability section
reduce the insurer's liability for uninsured motorist cover-
age," received the Court's scrutiny. The Court held that both
clauses "violate[d] KRS 304.682(1) [now KRS § 304.20-
020(1)] by undertaking to reduce liability below the statuto-
rily required minimum [of $10,000] or to impose qualifications
on coverage not recognized by the statute, '26 and were there-
fore void.
This interpretation of the uninsured motorist statute led
to numerous invalidation attacks against insurance companies
attempting to reduce their liability for uninsured motorist
coverage. Not all attempts by insurance carriers to lessen
their liability were unsuccessful, 2 as an analysis of the cases
tion of the statute). The McNutt court decided:
The exclusion relied upon by the insurance company here is nothing more
than an attempt to thwart the purposes of the statute, since, if it is con-
strued as the defendants would have it construed, it would deny to the
owners of more than one automobile insurance policy and the owner of
more than one automobile the right to recover on more than one policy,
when the injury occurred in one of the automobiles covered by the policies.
The designation of the so-called exclusion as an "[e]xclusion" does not op-
erate to make it valid where it is in repugnance to the statute, and here it is
plain that the clause is in repugnance to the statute.
369 F. Supp. at 385. That prediction as to what the Kentucky Court would do with
such an issue turned out to be incorrect. Yet, when the Court was faced with the issue
in Whitlock and in Hubbard, no mention of McNutt was even made.
2 The "other insurance" clause is set out at note 22 supra. The other provision
which Meridian claimed limited its coverage provided:
The Company shall not be obligated to pay under this Coverage that part
of the damages which the Insured may be entitled to recover from the own-
er or operator of an uninsured automobile which represents expenses for
medical services paid or payable under the Medical Payments Coverage of
the policy.
451 S.W.2d at 835.
26 Id.
17 See note 23 supra for a list of cases involving such attacks.
28 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Christian, 555 S.W.2d 571 (Ky.
1977) (motorcycle exclusion upheld); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 551
S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1977) (motorcycle exclusion upheld); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 554 (Ky. 1977) (requirement that the unin-
sured motorist coverage not benefit the workmen's compensation carrier upheld);
Commonwealth Union Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 550 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1977) (exclusion of a
state-owned vehicle from the definition of uninsured automobile is valid); Allen v.
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reveals an interesting trend. The Court will, in situations
where actual damages are in excess of the minimum benefits
required by the uninsured motorist statute, deny an insurance
company the benefit of a policy provision purporting to re-
duce its liability under uninsured motorist coverage because
of collateral payments, if the result will be a payment of unin-
sured motorist benefits of less than the statutorily required
minimum. If the company attempts to avoid coverage alto-
gether, however, by excluding the alleged insured or class of
insureds from the scope of its contractual coverage, the Court
will uphold the terms of the contract if the exclusion is rea-
sonable. Thus the plaintiff in Siddons recovered in full under
two separate policies which were issued to him on his motor
vehicles for the death of his stepson to whom no specific ex-
clusion applied. Whitlock, however, was unable to recover be-
cause he was occupying an automobile subject to a specific ex-
clusion. The Court apparently has made a value judgment
that in the latter instance it is reasonable for an insurance
company to exclude from its uninsured motorist coverage an
automobile operated by the insured without the required lia-
bility coverage29 or to limit recovery to the policy actually cov-
West Am. Ins. Co., 467 S.W.2d 123 (Ky. 1971) (upheld provision excluding uninsured
members of insured's household from liability coverage and uninsured motorist cover-
age). Two cases decided prior to Siddons also upheld policy requirements precluding
coverage: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boston, 439 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1969) (requirement of notice
to company prior to suit is a valid condition precedent, non-compliance with which is
a bar to recovery); Rosenbaum v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 432 S.W.2d 45 (Ky.
1968) (upheld provision excluding a farm wagon from the definition of an uninsured
automobile). See also Savage, supra note 1, at 631, for cases upholding the policy
requirement that contact be made between the uninsured vehicle and the insured
vehicle--:the "hit and run" cases.
For a general treatment of uninsured motorist law outside of Kentucky, see P.
PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS (1972); A. WDiss, A GUmE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE (1969).
For more recent discussion of specific problems in uninsured motorist law in
other states see Davis, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Some Significant Problems
and Developments, 42 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1977); Comment, Uninsured Motorist Cover-
age in Louisiana, 24 LOYOLA L. REV. 85 (1978); Comment, The Kansas Uninsured
Motorist Statute-"Other Insurance Clauses" and the Problem of the "Unnamed
Insured," 16 WASHBURN L.J. 764 (1977).
29 KRS § 304.39-090 (Supp. 1978) requires the owners of all motor vehicles to
obtain appropriate security. Carrying liability insurance coverage is one proper way to
achieve compliance with the statute.
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ering the occupied vehicle when an insured is covered by more
than one policy.so
If the above analysis is a fair characterization of the
Court's decisions, it is difficult to reconcile a determination
that the "other insurance" clauses' which was denied effect in
Siddons was in derogation of the statute, yet the owned, "un-
insured" vehicle exclusion in Whitlock and Hubbard was
not.32 Apparently, an insurance company may avoid the Sid-
dons problem by hedging the uninsured motorist coverage
with various reasonable exclusions until a pedestrian is no
longer covered or by possibly stipulating that coverage exists
only when the insured is occupying the vehicle named in the
policy.3 3 Eventually, the Court may be forced to draw the line
with respect to reasonable exclusions and either reconcile Sid-
dons with the more recent trend or declare it no longer viable
in this respect.
2. Reduction of Uninsured Motorist Benefits by Payments
Made Under Personal Injury Protection
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fletch-
er,3" the Court considered the validity of a clause in Kentucky
No Fault automobile insurance policies which allowed the in-
surance company to reduce any amount payable under its un-
insured motorist protection "by the amount of any personal
" See Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Hubbard, 578 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1979).
" See note 22 supra for delineation of the "other insurance" clause utilized in
Siddons.
32 From a practical standpoint, there is little reason to distinguish between the
decedent in Siddons, a pedestrian, and the decedent in Hubbard, who was occupying
his own "uninsured" automobile. Nevertheless, the owned, uninsured vehicle exclu-
sion (which applies only through precise use of policy definitions) avoids coverage in
Hubbard where an "other insurance" clause would not be able to restrict coverage in
light of Siddons.
13 If it is reasonable for the insurer to deny coverage based on the status or loca-
tion of the insured at the time of the accident, such as being an occupant of an
owned, but uninsured vehicle, riding upon a motorcycle, or living in the same house-
hold as the defendant, then it may be reasonable to exclude an insured from coverage
for taking the risks encountered by a pedestrian. The problem in a case like Siddons
then would not be how much coverage was afforded, but whether there was any cov-
erage at all. If such an exclusion was deemed to be reasonable, no coverage would
exist.
34 578 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1979).
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injury protection benefits [PIP] paid or payable under this or
any other automobile insurance policy. . . ."5 The Court had
little trouble upholding the trial court's and the court of ap-
peals' decisions that the clause was invalid:
By its plain terms, the effect of the policy provision in issue
here is to reduce the amount payable under UM [uninsured
motorist] coverage by the amount payable under PIP cover-
age in every case. To put it another way, PIP coverage is
always set off against UM coverage regardless of the nature
and source of the damages for personal injury.
This means that in any case in which PIP is payable
less than $10,000.00 UM is payable. This result is repugnant
to the mandate of the legislature that not less than
$10,000.00 UM coverage be provided. This policy provision
is void because public policy will not permit the contract to
take away that which the statute requires to be given."6
Fletcher is another case in the line refusing to allow an
insurance company to decrease the dollar amount payable
under the uninsured motorist coverage below the statutory
minimum of $10,000.37 The decision reiterates the Kentucky
position that if coverage is found to exist and if sufficient
damages are proved, the insured must pay the minimum stat-
utory amount. Fletcher is of further significance because it
details the relationship of uninsured motorist coverage to the
Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. Consideration of that facet of
the decision will be delayed until discussion of cases involving
35 Id. at 43. The entire provision was: "(a) any amount payable under the unin-
sured motorist coverage [UM] shall be reduced by the amount of any personal injury
protection benefits [PIP] paid or payable under this or any other automobile insur-
ance policy because of bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person." Id.
The MVRA refers to those benefits paid pursuant to the Act as basic reparation
benefits [hereinafter BRB], but insurance policies often refer to the same type of
benefits as personal injury protection [hereinafter PIP]. PIP benefits also can include
first party coverage not required to be paid under BRB. When speaking of no-fault
coverage, the terms can be used interchangeably.
Further discussion of BRB as they relate to uninsured motorist protection is
delayed until discussion of the MVRA. See notes 102-111 and accompanying text
infra.
30 578 S.W.2d at 43. (citing State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Am. Ins.
Co., 550 S.W.2d 554 (Ky. 1977)).
"7 See note 23 supra for other cases in this line.
1979-1980]
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the MVRA8
B. Stacking
In the final uninsured motorist case to be discussed
herein,39 Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield,0 the
plaintiff, Stanfield, was seriously injured when his police mo-
torcycle was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. Stanfield
was covered under policies issued by two insurers. He also had
two separate policies with Buckeye Union Insurance Company
covering his personal vehicle. In addition, Ohio Casualty In-
surance Company, his employer's insurer, insured all sixty-
three Newport Police Department vehicles under one policy,
although separate premiums were computed on each vehicle. 1
The major issue presented to the Court was the extent of
Ohio Casualty's liability. The parties agreed that, as an em-
ployee of the Newport Police Department, Stanfield was in-
sured under the Newport policy with Ohio Casualty and
therefore that Ohio Casualty was liable. The litigants dis-
agreed considerably, however, over the amount of that liabil-
ity. The insurer admitted liability only to the extent of the
$10,000 minimum statutory coverage afforded to one vehicle
whereas Stanfield claimed he should be able to "stack" the
coverages provided for all vehicles insured under the policy,
increasing Ohio Casualty's potential liability to $630,000.42
" See text accompanying notes 102-111 infra for discussion of the MVRA aspect
of Fletcher.
" Although Hanover Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 573 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978),
also involves uninsured motorist law, it is discussed in the text accompanying notes
122-125 infra because of its significant impact on the relationship between the
MVRA and uninsured motorist coverage.
40 581 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. 1979). This case is a reversal of the court of appeals'
decision, No. CA-65-8-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1977). See Savage, supra note 1, at
632 for a discussion of the court of appeals' opinion.
41 581 S.W.2d at 555-56.
42 Stacking was recognized judicially in Kentucky in Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970), although the Court never used the term. The
effect of stacking is that where two or more insurance policies are available to the
insured, the limits of each policy are stacked upon each other to increase the source
of compensation rather than splitting the liability proportionately among the insur-
ers. Thus beginning with the primary coverage, each limit is exhausted before taking
the next policy, and each policy is available up to its stated limit.
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Stanfield relied on Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Siddons which held that, when an insurer provides an insured
with more than one insurance policy, each policy is required
by statute to contain the minimum coverage and that an
"other insurance" clause which frustrates the statutory com-
mand is invalid. Under Siddons, one policy is treated as pri-
mary and the other as excess, stacking them if sufficient dam-
ages are shown. There is no reason why this principle cannot
logically be extended beyond two policies if the insured proves
both coverage and damages.4
Justice Reed, writing for the Court in Stanfield," did not
disagree with the concept of stacking, but "the type of insured
who is seeking to stack coverages" was more significant to
him. The named insured, the city of Newport, was entitled to
broad protection as the first class insured. A named insured is
entitled to uninsured motorist coverage irrespective of
whether he or she was occupying one of the covered
automobiles and, as payor of the total premium, could recover
separately for each vehicle.46 Stanfield, however, was a second
class insured under the policy, insured only while "occupying
43 It should also be pointed out that the decision does not foreclose stacking of
coverages under a single policy/multiple vehicle situation if the named insured is
seeking the stacked coverage. A final decision in that regard must await the proper
circumstances. The treatment of that issue in other jurisdictions has been inconsis-
tent. See Comment, Intra Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Pay-
ments Coverages-To Be or Not To Be, 22 S.D.L. Rav. 349 (1977).
" Justice Stephenson dissented from the portion of the majority opinion permit-
ting stacking. While agreeing that the majority opinion was a "logical extension of
Siddons," Justice Stephenson believed that Siddons and its progeny were not consis-
tent with or mandated by the uninsured motorist statute and should be overruled.
581 S.W.2d at 559-60 (Stephenson, J. dissenting).
4 581 S.W.2d at 556.
46 Two problems must be noted with respect to the distinction in classes of in-
sured persons as made by the Court. First, under the Ohio Casualty policy, no named
insured will take advantage of uninsured motorist benefits. It simply is not possible
for the City of Newport to suffer personal injury, the only type of injury compensable
by uninsured motorist protection.
Second, the broad protection afforded to first class insureds is not really as broad
as the Court suggested. Justice Reed stated: "Insureds of the first class are protected
regardless of their location or activity from damages caused by injury inflicted by an
uninsured motorist." Id. Whitlock and Hubbard reveal that the protection is not so
all-encompassing.
1979-19801
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an insured highway vehicle ' 47 and insured only because of
that status. Since he derived his rights from occupying an in-
sured vehicle, Stanfield's right to recover attached to that one
vehicle. The Court held that Stanfield was "precluded from
stacking the coverage in his employer's policy ' 48 and thus was
entitled to receive only the 10,000 protection which accompa-
nied the motorcycle upon which he was riding.4
In one respect, Stanfield is a clear reaffirmation of Sid-
dons and culminates a decade of judicial approval of stack-
ing.50 In another respect, however, the resolution of the case
represents a strong judicial reluctance to extend the Siddons
rationale beyond its original scope.
II. MOTOR VEHICLE REPARATIONS ACT
The MVRA recently has become a focus of judicial atten-
tion.51 The Act, adopted amid much "controversy",52 was a re-
cent source of confusion, and finally is being clarified by the
47 581 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34 (Kan.
1969)).
48 581 S.W.2d at 559.
'9 In reading the opinion it becomes clear that the Court did not want "an em-
ployee who did not pay the premium [to] stack coverages contained in his employer's
liability policy." 581 S.W.2d at 556. It is interesting to note that payment of the pre-
mium was not regarded as significant in Siddons where one policy did not contain the
required uninsured motorist coverage and therefore no premium could have been
charged. 451 S.W.2d at 833.
50 Stanfield unequivocally held that if the primary coverage provided by Ohio
Casualty was exhausted, Stanfield could stack the coverage afforded in his two poli-
cies with Buckeye Union on his personal vehicles. 581 S.W.2d at 559. It would be
interesting to know, although apparently it was not argued, whether Stanfield's per-
sonal policies contained any exclusions of the type found valid in Whitlock and Hub-
bard and discussed in the text accompanying notes 8-33 supra. Since the Court was
not faced with any such exclusions, the only question it had to consider with regard
to the two separate personal policies was the propriety of stacking as announced orig-
inally in Siddons. For a general treatment of stacking, see PRETZEL, supra note 28, at
87-88.
51 At the time of the last survey of Kentucky insurance law, only two MVRA
cases had been decided. One of those, Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975),
upheld the constitutionality of the MVRA; the other was a court of appeals decision
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court during this past survey year, United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Smith, 580 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979). See Savage, supra note
1, at 638-40.
52 Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Ky. 1975). See also Note, Kentucky
No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 Ky. L.J. 466, 470-71 (1976-77).
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appellate courts of the Commonwealth. The courts by no
means have eliminated all of the problems surrounding the
Act, but recent court opinions afford some assistance.
The uninsured motorist cases discussed above are part of
a distinct line, necessitating presentation of those cases in
their historical context. Because of the unique nature of Ken-
tucky's no fault law53 and the absence of prior decisions, the
recent MVRA cases are best analyzed by organizing them ac-
cording to subject matter 54 and focusing on the courts' inter-
pretation of the Act. To the extent possible, trends as well as
the consistencies and inconsistencies in the judicial ap-
proaches will be indicated.
A. Constitutionality and Application
The MVRA's constitutionality was tested prior to the ef-
fective date of the Act in Fann v. McGuffey.55 In Fann, the
Court upheld the Act against a broad constitutional attack"6
while reserving for later consideration, under more appropri-
ate circumstances, decision on the specific application of the
Act to certain situations.57 During the past year, two of those
situations arose.58
13 The Kentucky MVRA is a combination of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Reparations Act and the version of the Florida No-Fault Act which was in effect
at the time Kentucky drafted its own Act. See Note, supra note 52, at 466.
"The no-fault cases have been grouped into three major areas: (1) cases dealing
with the constitutionality and application of the Act in particular cases; (2) several
cases that provide insight into the way that benefits under the Act must be coordi-
nqted to provide recovery and reimbursement to all parties involved; and, (3) cases
that examine the statutory threshold for suits involving pain and suffering.
" 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975). The case was decided on June 27, 1975, just prior
to the July 1, 1975 effective date of the Act.
86 534 S.W.2d at 772-76. In reaching its decision, the Court provided a broad
overview of the Act.
57 The question of what constituted sufficient operation or use to subject one to
the Act's limitations, 534 S.W.2d at 774 n.19, and the application of the Act to non-
resident motorists, Id. at 775 n.27, were reserved explicitly for another occasion.
18 In Lyle v. Swanks and Madison Standard Serv. Station, 577 S.W.2d 427 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979), another situation arose which was not addressed by Fann. Lyle, the
plaintiff, sued a service station for personal injuries which occurred on the defen-
dant's property. He claimed that the Act did not apply to automobile accidents which
occur on private property though admitting that he had no claim if the Act applied.
The court held that the Act does not define where accidents must occur, and as long
as the claimant has operated, maintained, or used a motor vehicle on the roldways of
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
1. Sufficient Operation or Use
The question of what constitutes sufficient operation or
use of a motor vehicle to result in an injured party being clas-
sified as an operator or user and thus subject to the MVRA's
limitations on his right of recovery was addressed by the court
of appeals in Probus v. Sirles.5 In Probus, Mary Probus was
injured while a passenger in her husband's automobile.
Neither Mary nor her husband carried automobile liability in-
surance. The couple brought an action against Joseph Sirles,
the other driver, seeking damages for personal injuries. The
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the Probuses made a number of constitutional attacks on the
Act.e0  Their strongest argument was the claim that Mary's
tort rights were not limited by the Act because she did not
own a car, having only recently obtained her driver's license,
and because she also did not live in a household with a basic
reparation insured."1 The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment and held that Mary Probus was "an operator or user
within the meaning of KRS 304.39-202"862 because she had en-
the state and has not filed the proper rejection, he is subject to the limitations of the
Act. Id. at 428-29.
59 569 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Probus was actually the third decision
determining the amount of use which is sufficient to bring one within the Act's limi-
tations. See also Atchison v. Overcast, 563 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) and Dixon
v. Cowles, 562 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1977).
60 Five other attacks on the Act were disposed of on the basis of Fann v. McGuf-
fey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975). Those arguments were: (1) that the plaintiff was not
covered by the Act since she was not covered under any automobile liability insur-
ance policy; (2) that indigents, because of their financial inability to obtain insurance,
were discriminated against by the Act in violation of equal protection; (3) that the
Act abridges the plaintiffs' privileges and immunities; (4) that the Act violated the
commerce clause by impeding the flow of interstate commerce; and (5) that the Act
deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected right to travel. 569 S.W.2d
at 709-11.
01 569 S.W.2d at 709.
62 Id. Probus was decided under a prior version of the Act in which "user" was
defined as "a person who is a basic reparation insured or would be a basic reparation
insured if such person had not rejected the limitations upon his tort rights. . ..."
1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 385, § 2(14) (repealed 1978). A "basic reparation insured" was
defined as
[a] person identified by name as an insured in a contract of basic reparation
insurance complying with this act and [w]hile residing in the same house-
hold with a named insured, the following persons not identified by name as
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gaged in driving while preparing for her license exam. While
Fann v. McGuffey left "open the question of how much opera-
tion or use will suffice"63 to limit one's tort rights, the court in
Probus determined that even minimal operation of a motor
vehicle was sufficient.
2. Nonresident Motorists
The MVRA does not on its face distinguish between Ken-
tucky residents and nonresidents; rather it seemingly is appli-
cable to any injury accident occurring in Kentucky.6 4 The ap-
plicability of the MVRA to nonresident motorists came before
the Kentucky courts for the first time in Stinnett v. Mul-
quin."5 In Stinnett, two Indiana residents who were injured in
an automobile accident in Kentucky brought suit in Jefferson
Circuit Court. The trial judge dismissed the action, holding
that it was barred by the Act. The court of appeals reversed,
stating that the "overriding question in determining this mat-
ter [was] whether the appellants had an affirmative opportu-
nity to reject the legislatively imposed limitation on an indi-
vidual's tort right to sue." 6 Thus the Stinnetts' claim could
be barred only if they had proper opportunity to reject the
restrictions imposed by the Act. The case was remanded to
the trial court "to determine the fact of whether an affirma-
an insured in any other contract of basic reparation insurance complying
with this act: a spouse or other relative of a named insured; and a minor in
the custody of a named insured or of a relative residing in the same house-
hold with the named insured if he usually makes his home in the same
family unit, even though he temporarily lives elsewhere.
1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 385, § 2(3).
The present version of the Act defines "user" as "a person who resides in a
household in which any person owns or maintains a motor vehicle." KRS § 304.39-
020(15) (Supp. 1978). The present definition will avoid results like that in Dixon v.
Cowles, 562 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), where the court held that a passenger in
an uninsured auto who did not own or maintain an automobile in the state, but who
was the wife of the operator of the uninsured automobile was not a basic reparation
insured and thus not a "user." She was therefore not barred from bringing a tort
action even though she would have been a "user" and barred from bringing an action
if her husband had complied with the statutes and obtained insurance.
63 534 S.W.2d at 774 n.19.
KRS § 304.39-030(1) (Supp. 1978).
6- 579 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"' Id. at 375.
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tive opportunity was provided the appellants to reject the lim-
itation on the right to sue.
''6
The court based its decision on the premise that "consti-
tutional protection should be afforded equally to those who
are affected by Kentucky law"6 and that such protection re-
quired that nonresidents be given the opportunity to reject
the limitations on the right to sue."' This is interesting in light
of Fann v. McGuffey, which upheld the Act on the basis of
implied consent, not actual consent.7 0 The Fann Court specifi-
cally rejected the notion that a lack of an opportunity to re-
ject was fatal to the applicability of the Act.7 1 Although Fann
is not directly on point with Stinnett because none of the par-
ties to Fann had standing "to litigate the rights of non-resi-
dent motorists,7 2 consistency would require that nonresidents
be deemed to have accepted the provisions of the Act by the
"registration, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehi-
cle and use of the public roadways" of the Commonwealth,
just as residents are deemed to have accepted the Act under
those conditions. 3 Stinnett seems to restrict severely the
scope of the MVRA by placing nonresidents on a different
plane from Kentucky residents, opening Kentucky's courts to
nonresidents when a Kentucky citizen would find the doors
closed.
617 Id. at 376.
:8 Id. at 375.
"' It should be noted that in Probus v. Sirles, 569 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978), a state resident's right to bring an action was limited by the Act although she
was not given an opportunity to reject its restriction. See text accompanying notes
59-63 supra for a detailed discussion of Probus v. Sirles.
Furthermore the nonresidents in Probus were paid BRB by their insurer who
provided the coverage pursuant to KRS § 304.39-100(2) (Supp. 1978). Thus these
defendants sought to gain from the Act but not be bound by its limitations.
70 534 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ky. 1975).
7
'Id. at 778. In its discussion of the constitutionality of the Act as applied to
those persons unable to reject because of a legal disability, the Court said: "As ex-
pressly stated in KRS 304.39-060(1), implied consent to the law hangs on one's use of
the highways, not on the failure to reject, which really is in the nature of an added
attraction." Id.
72 Id. at 779.
73 KRS § 304.39-060(1) (Supp. 1978).
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B. Coordination of Benefits
Extensive litigation has arisen from the provisions of the
MVRA which describe the duties and rights of the basic repa-
ration obligor. 4 Although the Act has undergone some change
through a 1978 amendment to KRS § 304.39-070, the prior
version of the statute is still relevant to accidents occurring
before the amendment.7 5
1. Computing Loss
The MVRA allows the reparation obligor to setoff work-
man's compensation benefits, social security benefits and cer-
tain income tax savings against reparation payments to the
insured.7 6 In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Smith, 7 the Court instructed in the mechanics of computa-
tion of the setoff.
In Smith, Peggy Smith, widow of the decedent, brought
an action against United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany (U.S.F.&G.), her husband's employer's reparation obli-
gor, to collect basic reparation benefits (BRB). U.S.F.&G. de-
nied payment, claiming that Smith already had received
workmen's compensation benefits and a recovery from the
tortfeasor's liability insurer which exceeded the amount paya-
71 In addition to the cases discussed herein, three additional cases have been de-
cided in Kentucky since the end of the survey year. See Hargett v. Dodson, 26 Ky.
Law Summ. 11, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 1979) (discretionary review granted De-
cember 13, 1979, 591 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1979)); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kidd, 26
Ky. Law Summ. 11, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 1979) (discretionary review granted
December 13, 1979, 591 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1979)); and Carlson v. McElroy, 589 S.W.2d
754 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
7' KRS § 304.39-070 as originally adopted was virtually the same as the first
three subsections to the present version. The 1978 amendment added subsections (4)
and (5) and the exception in subsection (3) referring to KRS § 304.39-140(3). 1978
Ky. Acts, ch. 215, § 4, ch. 384 § 104.
7- KRS § 304.39-250 (Supp. 1978) provides the basic rule; the "except as other-
wise provided" clause pertains to KRS § 304.39-120 which sets out exceptions. There
is also a maximum $10,000 of BRB payable. KRS § 304.39-050(3) (Supp. 1978). See
also Note, supra note 52, at 478-81, 512-17.
7" 580 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979). The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
decision, No. CA-1369-MR (Ky. App. Jan. 16, 1978), which received extensive ,discus-
sion in the last Kentucky Law Survey on insurance. See Savage, supra note 1, at 638-
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ble to her as BRB. U.S.F.&G. argued that these recoveries
from collateral sources should be setoff against the BRB paya-
ble, thus eliminating U.S.F.&G.'s liability.7 8 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and remanded the case to the
circuit court with the following instruction: "If it should be
determined ... that the insured incurred loss not otherwise
compensated, the insurer, U.S.F.&G., shall be liable for that
loss not to exceed the limits of liability as set forth in the pol-
icy of insurance."7 The reasons for the Court's decision are
clear. KRS § 304.39-120 requires that workmen's compensa-
tion benefits be "subtracted in calculating net loss"q--net
loss being the amount compensable by BRB.81 Thus the first
step in the calculation is to determine the claimant's actual
economic loss, then to deduct those items permitted by the
Act.82 The resulting figure is net loss for which BRB are paya-
ble up to the policy limits or the amount of the net loss,
whichever is less. It is therefore possible that in some cases
the policy limit may not be reached and full BRB not paid,
but the allowable deductions are never initially subtracted
from the policy limits as was argued by U.S.F.&G.8 3
The court of appeals was presented with a similar argu-
ment by an insurer in Ammons v. Winklepleck." At first
blush, Ammons bears little resemblance to Smith. In Am-
mons, the insurer fully paid the BRB and then attempted a
reduction of the amount payable for bodily injury liability by
the amount of BRB already paid. Smith concerned an in-
surer's attempt to reduce the amount of BRB payable. Both
decisions, however, bear upon the relationship between BRB
and collateral sources and illustrate the judicial interpretation
of the statutory policy forbidding double recovery.
In Ammons, Sheryl Ann Winklepleck was injured seri-
78 580 S.W.2d at 217-18.
70 Id. at 218.
80 KRS § 304.39-120(1) (Supp. 1978).
81 Id. § 304.39-020(2) (Supp. 1978), defines BRB as "benefits providing reim-
bursement for net loss" with the maximum amounts of such payments totaling
$10,000.
82 580 S.W.2d at 219-20.
,Id. at 219.
570 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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ously in a single car accident while she was a passenger in
John Ammon's automobile. Indiana Insurance Company pro-
vided both bodily injury liability coverage and BRB coverage
with limits of $25,000 and $10,000, respectively. After paying
$10,000 in BRB and $15,000 for bodily injury liability, Indiana
Insurance contended that it had fulfilled its obligations. Win-
klepleck argued that an additional $10,000 was payable. Be-
cause actual damages exceeded the policy limits, 5 the rela-
tionship of BRB to this collateral source (bodily injury
liability coverage) was directly in question.
The insurer argued that the insurance statutes expressed
a policy forbidding double recovery and that payment of BRB
to the full limits under the bodily injury liability coverage
would constitute a double recovery to the extent of the BRB
paid.8 6 Judge Park, writing for the court, disagreed. "Win-
klepleck has not recovered twice for the same items of dam-
age."8 7 Basic reparation payments were payable regardless of
fault and extinguished Ammons' liability to the extent that
those benefits were payable.88 However, damages incurred be-
yond the $10,000 maximum of BRB or for noneconomic items
of loss, if the threshold was met, were compensable by Am-
mons' liability coverage. Obviously, "[u]nder the MVRA, the
[bodily injury liability] coverage and the BRB coverage had
been exhausted."89 Permitting full recovery under each cover-
age did not constitute double recovery since each coverage ap-
plied to separate items of loss.9
2. Subrogation
KRS § 304.39-070, which provides for subrogation of the
insured's right of recovery to the reparation obligor, was
amended in 1978.91 Although Ohio Security Insurance Co. v.
81 Id. at 288.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
91 Id. at 289.
91 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 215, § 4, ch. 384, § 104.
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Drury92 was litigated under the prior statute, it is instructive
in understanding the amendment.93 In Drury, the plaintiff,
Francis Drury, was injured in an automobile collision with the
tortfeasor, Wessel. After collecting the $10,000 limit of BRB
from his reparation obligor, Drury sought further recovery
from Wessel. Wessel's liability insurer, Ohio Security, made
an out of court settlement offer for the policy limits of
$10,000, although Drury's claim was conceded to be worth
much more. Drury's reparation obligor intervened pursuant to
KRS § 304.39-070(3), seeking recovery from Ohio Security for
the $10,000 in BRB it paid Drury. The issue presented was
whether Ohio Security was liable for a total of $20,000,
$10,000 to Drury and $10,000 to his reparation obligor, on a
policy with a $10,000 limit. The court of appeals held that
Ohio Security was required to pay the full $20,000. 4 The
court pointed out that the right of subrogation in KRS §
304.39-070(3) is not true subrogation in the sense that there is
a transfer of the rights of the insured to the insurer, since the
insured has no right of recovery to the extent BRB are paid or
payable.95 Instead, the reparation obligor's right of recovery is
a right of "reimbursement by virtue of the provision of [KRS
§ 304.39-070(3)], or by operation of law."9 Since "the purpose
of the statute is to allocate, still under a fault concept, the
ultimate responsibility for the benefits paid to injured par-
ties, '97 the court of appeals agreed with the trial court's deter-
mination "that KRS § 304.39-070(3) creates a separate right
of recovery in the basic reparation obligor,"9 thus requiring
9 582 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
91 In addition, cases discussed subsequently continue to be important since many
other cases which must be decided under the original Act still undoubtedly exist at
some stage of the litigation process. See Note, supra note 52, at 512-17 for a discus-
sion of this statutory subrogation. See also note 75 supra for the recent changes to
KRS § 304.39-070 (Supp. 1978).
14 582 S.W.2d at 67.
93 Id. at 68. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 578 S.W.2d 41
(Ky. 1979) and KRS § 304.39-060(2)(a) (Supp. 1978)).
" Id.
97 Id. at 67.
98 Id. For more recent cases involving the rights of the basic reparation obligor
under KRS § 304.39-070, see Hargett v. Dodson, 26 Ky. L. Summ. 11, at 2 (Ky. Ct.
App. July 27, 1979) [hereinafter cited as KLS] (discretionary review granted Decem-
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reimbursement of BRB paid without regard to policy limits.
Subsection (4) to KRS § 304.39-070, which was added by
the 1978 amendment,9 limits a liability carrier's obligation to
the policy limits. The policy limit is first used to satisfy any
claim brought by an injured party under KRS § 304.39-
060(2)(a) or (b).100 If any coverage remains, it is subject to the
subrogation claim of the reparation obligor pursuant to KRS §
304.39-070(3).1 01 In Ohio Security, Drury's claim would have
exhausted the liability limits, leaving nothing for the repara-
tion obligor. While this restricts the subrogation rights of a
BRB payor, it holds down the loss to a liability insurer,
thereby spreading the costs to more insurers.
3. Relationship with Uninsured Motorist Benefits
The Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Fletcher 02 invalidated a policy provision
which attempted to reduce uninsured motorist benefits paya-
ble by the amount of PIP103 paid or payable.10 4 Significantly,
the Court did not stop after declaring the policy provision
void, but also attempted to harmonize the policies behind
KRS § 304.20-020. 1 05 The Court determined that KRS §
ber 13, 1979, 591 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1979)); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kidd, 26 KLS
11, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 1979) (discretionary review granted December 13,
1979, 591 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1979)); and Carlson v. McElroy, 584 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979).
" See note 75 supra for delineation of the form of the amendment.
100 See text accompanying notes 112-13 infra for discussion of KRS §§ 304.39-
060(2)(a) and 304.39-060(2)(b).
101 This result is reached by reading KRS § 304.39-070(4) (Supp. 1978) in con-
junction with KRS § 304.39-140(3) (Supp. 1979).
102 578 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1979). This case was previously discussed in connection
with uninsured motorist law in the text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
103 PIP is essentially the same as BRB in this respect, PIP being the insurance
policy designation for BRB. See note 35 supra for an explanation of these
abbreviations.
104 Presumably a similar provision reducing PIP by the amount of uninsured mo-
torist benefits paid or payable would likewise be void in light of the express language
in the MVRA that "basic reparation benefits shall be paid without deduction or set-
off." KRS § 304.39-250 (Supp. 1978).
105 KRS § 304.20-020 (Supp. 1978) concerns uninsured motorist coverage while
BRB are guaranteed by KRS § 304.39-030 (Supp. 1978).
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304.39-070(2),106 which subrogates the right to proceed against
an unsecured tortfeasor to the reparation obligor, was the key
to the process. The result of that statute is that "the insured
no longer owns the claim against the uninsured tortfeasor for
damages compensable under PIP";10 7 that claim is held by the
reparation obligor. As a result, the uninsured motorist carrier
has no liability to the extent BRB are paid or payable. 103 If
damages exceed $10,000 or are not the type of damages com-
pensable by BRB,109 however, the uninsured motorist carrier
must pay up to its limit of liability.110 "Hence, in an appropri-
ate case an insured may collect the limits of both the PIP and
the UM coverages. The only interdiction is that there be no
double recovery for the same items of damage."' The result
is that BRB are always payable, and in cases where other
types of damages are appropriate or where the maximum pay-
ment of BRB does not fully compensate the victim, uninsured
motorist benefits are payable up to the policy limits.
C. Threshold
The MVRA cases discussed above primarily concern that
part of the Act which abolishes liability to the extent BRB are
payable. 112 A second limitation under the Act prohibits the re-
covery of "damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish
and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease"' 1 3 unless certain conditions are met. The first of those
conditions is that the plaintiff's medical expense must exceed
,00 578 S.W.2d at 44. An uninsured motorist can be pursued directly by the basic
reparation obligor and by the uninsured motorist carrier, if both must pay their in-
sured. KRS § 304.20-020(4) (Supp. 1978).
107 578 S.W.2d at 44.
108 Cf. Ammons v. Winklepleck, 570 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), in which
the relationship of bodily injury liability coverage and BRB are discussed.
100 See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 573 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978),
which held that a suit for pain and suffering against an uninsured motorist is not
limited by the threshold requirement of the Act.
110 578 S.W.2d at 44.
"I Id. (emphasis added). See Judge Park's discussion of separate items of dam-
age in Ammons v. Winklepleck, 570 S.W.2d 287, 288-89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
KRS § 304.39-060(2)(a) (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b) (Supp. 1978).
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$1,000.114 The most important case involving this limitation
during the survey year was Bolin v. Grider.115 The issue
presented in Bolin was the manner in which a factual dispute
over this threshold requirement should be presented to the
jury. 1
In Bolin, Stephen Grider sued Beverly Bolin, alleging
$1,028 in medical expenses. His right to maintain the suit was
dependent upon "establishing that his 'medical expense' ex-
ceeds $1,000.00.117 There was no evidence rebutting the stat-
utory presumption""' that the expenses submitted were rea-
sonable; the only related evidence tended to show that the
medical expenses were not in fact caused by the collision
which led to the lawsuit.-"' Both the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court ordered the case remanded for a new trial be-
cause of the inadequacy of the instruction to the jury on the
threshold issue.12 0 The Court tendered its own jury instruc-
tion: "Are you satisfied from the evidence that Grider in-
curred charges in excess of $1,000.00 for reasonably needed
products, services and accommodations, including those for
medical care and physical rehabilitation, as a result of the col-
lision of July 7, 1975? 1121
The other significant case concerning the threshold provi-
sion turned on the plain language of KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b).
,,4 Id. Medical expense is defined by KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) (Supp. 1978). The
other conditions in KRS 304.39-060(2)(b) (Supp. 1978) relate to the seriousness of the
injury suffered by the plaintiff and have not yet received judicial interpretation in
Kentucky.
'15 580 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1979). Higgins v. Searcy, 572 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978), also was decided during the survey year and concerned the threshold require-
ment. Following Duncan v. Beck, 553 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), the court held
in Higgins that the plaintiff must produce some evidence of permanent injury when
the medical expenses do not total $1,000. The plaintiff in Higgins had not required
medical treatment since twenty months earlier and the court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendant because the plaintiff's expenses did not total $1,000.
116 580 S.W.2d at 490.
11"7 Id.
1's See KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) (Supp. 1978). Bolin also discussed this section of
the Act. 580 S.W.2d at 491.
119 580 S.W.2d at 490.
120 The instruction given by the trial court read: "Do you believe from the evi-
dence that the necessary and reasonable medical expenses incurred by Stephen
Grider as a direct result of this collision on July 7, 1975, exceed $1,000.00?" Id.
121 Id. at 491.
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In Hanover Insurance Co. v. Blincoe,122 Robert Blincoe was
awarded $10,000 for pain and suffering by the Jefferson Cir-
cuit Court against Hanover Insurance Company, his unin-
sured motorist carrier.123 The insurer paid Blincoe the BRB
which he was due, but denied any obligation to pay under the
uninsured motorist provision unless Blincoe could prove that
his action against the uninsured tortfeasor met the threshold
requirements of KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b). The court held that
the threshold requirement "is specifically applied only to ac-
tions in tort brought against 'the owner, registrant, operator
or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security
has been provided as required in this subtitle.' ",124 Since the
subsection did not pertain to actions against uninsured
tortfeasors, Blincoe's tort rights were not limited in this re-
spect and the uninsured motorist carrier had to pay regardless
of the threshold requirement. 12 5
122 573 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
123 Id. at 931.
124 Id. (emphasis by the court).
126 Liability still is abolished to the extent BRB are paid or payable, thus no
double recovery results. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 578 S.W.2d
41 (Ky. 1979).
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